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Eastern enlargement is generally assumed not to take place before the year 2000, with a
first accession of at least some of the 10 Central and Eastern European Countries
(CEECs) that have association agreements with the European Union (EU). In spite of
uncertainties about the time and scope of enlargement, it is not premature to start
reflecting on EU structural assistance to CEECs. One reason is that all external
assistance has - wanted or not - a regional impact as it is allocated to certain locations
and therefore requires some decisions on priority regions and activities. Second, pre-
accession aid to CEECs should be designed in a way that allows a smooth switch-over
from existing funds (such as PHARE) to the Structural Funds in order to facilitate
accession. This means not only to adjust pre-accession aid to the Structural Funds, but
may also require - in the opposite direction - to prepare the Structural Funds for the
CEECs. Whatever the modalities of transition will be, it is clear that sooner or later
there will have to be an equal treatment of old and new Member States after a certain
period.
This paper will proceed as follows. After summarising briefly the national development
gap of the CEECs relative to the EU (section 2), a more comprehensive view will be
taken on the CEECs’ regions (section 3). Section 4 presents some theoretical considera-
tions on whether priority should be given to national or to regional development policy.
Section 5 discusses several implications for EU structural assistance. Section 6 summa-
rises and concludes.
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The most frequently applied indicator for the level of development, GDP per capita, is
difficult to calculate for CEECs. As the socialist systems had a different system of eco-
nomic accounting, some efforts had to be done on changing it to the international stan-
dardised system, and will still involve some problems as, for example, accounting for
the black economy. In order to allow for international comparisons, the conversion on
the basis of market exchange rates can be misleading if exchange rates differ from
purchasing power parities due to international price differences. Therefore, Eurostat and
the OECD have calculated GDP on the basis of purchasing power parities (PPPs) for all
European countries which take account of these differences. The outcome of these
calculations can be seen in table 2.1 in the annex which gives GDP per head in US$ PPP
in 1993 for the 15 EU Member States and the 10 associated CEECs.
                                                
1 This section draws mainly from work carried out by DG II-F-1, most of which is published regularly in
European Economy Supplement C - Economic Reform Monitor.2
The most striking result is that in all associated countries income per capita in 1993 was
lower than in the poorest EU Member State, i.e. Greece. Income differences were con-
siderable among the associated CEECs themselves reaching from Slovenia (9,210 US$)
to Latvia (3,070 US$). Compared to the EU15 average income (17,118 US$), the 10
associated countries’ average was at 29%. Assuming an EU of 25 member states in 1993
increases income disparities as measured by the (unweighted) coefficient of variation
which would have doubled from 23% (EU15) to 46% (EU25). The reduced income av-
erage from 17,118 US$ (EU15) to 14,412 (EU25) helps distinguishing different country
groups. All present Member States would have been above average in 1993, except for
the cohesion countries that ranged from 97% (IRL) to 74% (GR) of the EU25 average.
The relative income of Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland
varied approximately between two thirds and one third of the EU25 average, whereas all
other countries would have been below 30%.
In the meanwhile, these figures have changed slightly since 1993 and will change
further in the future due to real GDP growth. Its rate is expected to be at 4.6% for the 10
associated CEECs at the average for the years 1994 to 1998, well above the EU15
average of 2.4% (see graph 2.1). For most of these countries, in particular for Poland
and the Czech Republic with growth rates above 5%, this means a process of catching-
up raising expectations for a further closing of the income gap to the present EU until
the time of accession.
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Other macro-economic indicators are also expected to improve further in the 10 CEECs.
The Czech Republic and Slovakia were the first to reach single-digit inflation rates.
Forecasts suggest that the differential in inflation rates between EU15 and CEEC10 will
be reduced from almost 40 percentage points in 1994 to 10 percentage points in 1998
(see graph 2.2). With the exception of the Czech Republic, unemployment had increased3
in all countries in the beginning of the transition and started to decline in the last years
as more and more new jobs have been created by the private sector. The trade balance,
which improved in most countries in 1994 following an improved export performance
and low domestic demand, is expected to deteriorate again in the next years due to an
increase of domestic demand, in particular for investment goods.
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While local administration has strengthened in most CEECs after 1989, regional ad-
ministrations at an intermediate level between the local and the national level
(comparable to NUTS 2 in the EU) have often lost power as they were regarded as an
artificial element in the structure of the state. This tendency has to be seen in a wider
historical context which is characterised by the fact that the CEECs’ national borders are
mostly an outcome of more or less arbitrary decisions after the two World wars. There-
fore, several countries - in particular Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania - have ethnic
minorities with a differing historical and cultural background. However, as regional and
local authorities had no major role to play in a centralised planning system, but the cen-
tral administrations still wanted to have a basis for regional planning, they created plan-
ning regions that were deviating from the historical regions. But with the political
change after 1989 these planning regions lost their legitimisation and were rarely
replaced by the historical regions in fear of excessively powerful regions, thus making it
extremely difficult to find political consensus for territorial reforms.
Czechoslovakia is a case in point for this aspect.2 Between 1960 and 1989 there were
five levels of administrations: a federal government, two republic governments, ten
                                                
2 For the following cf. OECD-CCET (1996), pp.19ff.4
large administrative regions (“kraj”) plus Prague and Bratislava, 114 districts (“okres”)
and over 7,500 municipal governments. The two leading objectives in this
administrative division were, first, to obscure the traditional division between Bohemia
and Moravia and, second, to create economic units with a major industrial complex.
After 1989, the “kraj” disappeared due to the spontaneous rejection of regional authority
by the lower levels and previously merged municipalities re-established their
independence. Within the Czech Republic, a proposal put forward in 1991 suggesting to
establish a system of regions such as Bohemia, Moravia, Prague and Silesia “generated
a mixed response and was never likely to be implemented”3. Similarly, in mid-1996 the
Slovakian government has designated eight new administrative regions, which control
infrastructure, education and other services, “in ways that will under-represent
Hungarians”4 who are concentrated along the southern border of Slovakia.
For these reasons it is not always clear what "regions" in the different CEECs are. Most
authors quoted in this paper take a pragmatic approach in looking at statistical regions
which are - in order to allow for time series - frequently identical with the regions of the
socialist era (see, for example, the old “kraj” for the Czech Republic and Slovakia in
map 3.1 in the annex). This is the main reason why the subsequent look at the regional
policies and the regions in the transformation process is characterised by insufficient
data and by a varying country coverage. Most literature and data is on the four Visegrad
countries, while hardly anything could be found on the Baltic states. As a particular
case, East Germany has been included in section 3.1 for illustrative purposes because it
is already fully integrated into the European Union and the Structural Policies.
5HJLRQDOSROLFLHVLQWUDQVLWLRQ
A high degree of specialisation following an inter-industry trade pattern was organised
between the member states of the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA),
which included all CEECs (except Romania): "For example, Bulgaria was chosen as a
major centre for mechanical engineering and electronics, Czechoslovakia for machinery
and consumer goods, while the USSR provided raw materials and energy in exchange
for manufactures."5 Consequently, dissolving the CMEA required a principal
reorientation of trade and production of the CEECs and their regions, shifting trade from
eastern to western countries which was one of the reasons for the recession in the
CEECs in the first half of the 1990s.
                                                
3 Ibid., p.21.
4 Economist of 10 August 1996, p.25.
5 European Commission (1992), No.3, p.15.5
More than 40 years of central planning have left their mark on most of the CEECs’
regions and is an important starting point for understanding the regional pattern in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe. At the same time, it is a necessary background for identifying
the present problems of these regions in the process of economic transformation.
In most CEECs, regional policy was essentially the outcome of national sectoral plans
which were the basis of decisions on the locations of investment, production and settle-
ment. As the planning process was largely influenced by political power which was larg-
est for the biggest firms and their politically nominated directors, there was a tendency
towards concentration and specialisation in few and - from an economic point of view -
often arbitrarily chosen locations. This system, in combination with an ideologically
based confidence in heavy industry and economies of scale, led to a high degree of
regional division of labour and locational specialisation often making regions
completely dependent on one large enterprise. In this way, sectoral and regional policies
became strongly interrelated.
However, a closer look at the individual CEECs in respect to their regional structures
shows some remarkable differences between these countries which can broadly be cate-
gorised in two groups: A first group of countries, including Bulgaria, the German
Democratic Republic, Hungary and Poland, did not undertake major efforts to reduce
inter-regional disparities and allocated industries - although with many exceptions -
according to traditional locational advantages as natural resources or agglomerations.
The underlying reason is that most of these countries had already established centres of
industrial production before the start of the socialist period which could not easily be
disregarded by the central planning institutions. In comparison to the west, inter-
regional income disparities were however low because the price and transfer system
reduced most of the disparities in living standards. A second group of countries, among
which Czechoslovakia, Romania and Slovenia, tried to allocate industries to all regions
of the country, in this way establishing new industrialised centres which reduced inter-
regional disparities but created intra-regional differences between the location of
industries, mostly cities, and their rural surroundings. A specific problem of this second
group of countries will be the sustainability of firms in locations that are not capable of
supplying the necessary inputs at competitive prices because of high transport costs. The
opening up of trade with western competitors has already revealed that many locations
chosen by planners have often completely disregarded the regional comparative
advantages and cannot survive without high subsidies.
Economic transformation had a varying impact on the CEECs’ regions. Domestic and
foreign investment is mainly concentrated on the capital regions, other urban regions
and regions bordering western countries. In spite of these polarisation effects, an imple-
mented regional policy can hardly be found in any of these countries because public6
spending had to be reduced and policies at the national level had the highest priority.
Regional policy is still the outcome of sectoral policies, but now resulting from
privatisation, infrastructure investment, foreign investment etc. A major regional
orientation can only be found in some countries with active labour market policies for
problem regions that were particularly badly affected by recession.6 A further regional
orientation is introduced by programmes and institutions on cross-border co-operation.
But in general, regional policies - even where concepts have been developed - are only
implemented on an ad hoc basis due to disputes over ministerial responsibilities, the
need to reform territorial administrative structures and the lack of financial resources.7
In %XOJDULD, centralised planning was focused on the structure of sectors and branches,
territorial plans basically being the outcome of sectoral plans.8 As high preference was
given to the growth of heavy industry, there was little investment neither in
infrastructure nor in the preservation of natural resources. In 1982, a system of regional
incentives was created to favour enterprises in lagging regions, but it was abolished in
1991 due to its effect of leading to inefficient management of supported firms. During
the transition period, regional aspects were given little priority which was largely
focused on macro-economic policies and privatisation.9 Although regional aspects were
present in many sector policies, there was hardly any co-ordination or coherence in
respect to regional planning. The most important regional policy measure was cross-
border co-operation with regions of the neighbouring countries.
The *HUPDQ'HPRFUDWLF5HSXEOLFexperienced the same pattern of regional specialisa-
tion as other CMEA countries, with a concentration of big firms in few regions (for
example, the chemical industry in the Halle region or services in East Berlin). The
policy of industrialisation was oriented at the traditional distribution of population and
reinforced the traditional disparities between the South and the North of East
Germany.10 After unification, regional policy in East Germany was exceptional for
CEECs due to the large transfers from West German and EU funds. Immediate
decisions with major effects on regional development in East Germany were to be taken
primarily in three policy areas: regional and local administration, privatisation of state-
owned firms as well as construction and upgrading of infrastructure. The re-introduction
of the Länder and the communes was a very fast process without major political friction
because experiences from West Germany and the time before 1952, when the federal
structure in East Germany was dissolved, could be used. Privatisation was managed by
                                                
6 Cf. European Commission (1993), No.4, p.29.
7 Cf. EPRC/RWI (1996), pp.173f. See tables 3.1 and 3.2 in the annex for the state of play of regional
development institutions and territorial administrations in Central and Eastern Europe.
8 Cf. Spiridonova (1995), pp.81ff.
9 Cf. Spiridonova (1995), pp.82ff.
10 Klemmer/Schrumpf (1990), p.123.7
the state-owned "Treuhandanstalt" which prepared and negotiated sales of firms to
private owners until the end of 1994. For many less attractive enterprises - in particular
the bigger industrial ones - this was a difficult task and involved high amounts of state
aids to make them attractive for investors. In some cases, discussions raised the issue if
a closing down of these enterprises would not be a preferable solution in cases where no
private investor was willing to buy them. Due to the high dependence of regions on
single enterprises this would have meant to have complete regions hit by high
unemployment and out-migration. As a consequence, the Federal Government gave
political guarantees for "industrial cores" which were subsequently preserved at high
costs. The decision on where to set priorities in the construction and upgrading of
infrastructure required - at least to a certain degree - a concept of spatial planning which
is in general a competence of the Länder. However, the Federal Government used its co-
ordinating competence to adopt orientation guidelines for the Eastern Länder which
identified twelve development regions and corridors between regions.11 The concept
was based on the principle of "decentralised concentration" by attempting to develop
centres in the different regions and to avoid a "hub and spoke"-type concentration on
Berlin. While this concept gave an orientation for infrastructure projects, the main
regional policy instrument of investment grants ("Gemeinschaftsaufgabe") did not
follow this approach: In contrast to West Germany, the decision to identify focal points
("Schwerpunktorte"), where grants can be higher than elsewhere, was left to the Länder
which made very little use of this option. The reasons were the difficulties to identify
these focal points during the transition process and the high availability of funds that did
not require a concentration.12 In the recent years some Eastern Länder have started to
identify focal points in rural and remote regions, motivated by equity considerations.13
In +XQJDU\, industrialisation took mainly place in Budapest, which provided 42% of
industrial employment in 1960, and some industries along the northern industrial axis.14
In 1971, aspects of regional development planning and regional priorities were incorpo-
rated into the financial distribution of resources and were changed to a quota system in
the 1980s. But these attempts for a de-concentration of industry were only partially suc-
cessful as disparities in infrastructure and human capital remained high between
Budapest and the other areas. In 1990, a Ministry for Environment and Regional
Development was established and regional incentive systems focused in particular on
the north-eastern areas. However, policy initiatives have a short-term perspective on
fighting unemployment rather than addressing structural weaknesses of the regions.15
                                                
11 For a graphical illustration see Europäische Kommission (1995), p.196
12 Cf. Henseler-Unger (1993), pp.63 and 73.
13 Cf. Lammers (1994), p.202f.
14 Cf. Szaló (1994), pp.82ff.
15 Cf. EPRC/RWI (1996), p.177.8
Still, more than half of the foreign investment is concentrated on Budapest and the
western part while the northern industrial areas and the eastern agricultural areas are of
marginal importance.16
Sectoral and territorial planning in 3RODQG used to be separated in a way that left
regional aspects inferior to the interests of powerful sectors and branches.17 Industrial-
urban-infrastructural complexes have been created in the regions of the major cities that
were already well equipped with industries and infrastructure. After 1990, regional
policies in Poland have remained weak in spite of the re-introduction of local
government.18 The fastest pace of privatisation occurred in highly industrialised regions
by the "capital" way of privatisation and in the city regions due to the change of
ownership in retail trade. Accordingly, the inflow of foreign capital has been
concentrated on the big urban centres and on the western part of the country. In 1992,
35% of all joint ventures were located in the voivodship of Warsaw and more than three
quarters in the 10 leading voivodships. A regional policy is almost non-existent with the
exception of labour market policy whose regionally oriented employment support is
determined by the level of regional unemployment.19
As for the second group of countries, &]HFKRVORYDNLDQ territorial planning was separated
from regional economic planning which led to a highly complex planning system.20 In
1976, territorial planning started the "project of urbanisation" which was "implemented
by imposing a central place-like structure to the Czechoslovakian territory which con-
sisted of seven levels ranging from the national centre down to non-central settlements
of lower importance."21 As urbanisation was closely related to industrialisation,
economic activity and population concentrated in the larger cities of the various regions
leading "to strong intra-regional differences while the differences between regions were
minimized"22. New industrial enterprises were frequently established in rural areas in
order to create a strong socialist urban working class society.23 Since 1993, the Czech
government has formulated regional development concepts and identified problem
areas.24 In the Ostrava region, an industrial conurbation in North Moravia, a Regional
Development Agency has been set up - partly supported by PHARE assistance - which
is responsible for promoting regional development, co-ordinating and attracting
                                                
16 Cf. Losoncz (1994), pp.105ff.
17 Cf. Gorzelak (1994).
18 Cf. Gorzelak (1994), p.302ff.
19 Cf. EPRC/RWI (1996), p.176.
20 Cf. Maier/Masek (1993), p.38ff.
21 Ibid., p.39.
22 Ibid., p.39.
23 Cf. OECD-CCET (1996), p.13.
24 Cf. EPRC/RWI (1996), p.178.9
investment, and identifying foreign sources of financial assistance.25 In 1994, districts
"affected by economic problems" were designated using a wide range of indicators and
financial incentives for regional SME support have been developed. The Slovakian
government has developed five strategic priorities to provide the legislative basis for
regional development, the promotion of regional aid, infrastructure, human capital and
information systems. By mid-1994, a regional enterprise fund and a regional
development agency has been established with the help of PHARE assistance.26
5RPDQLD had a different kind of industrial specialisation as it was not member of the
CMEA and implemented a policy of self-sufficiency. But the national diversification did
not prevent from high regional specialisation which was seen as necessary to exploit
economies of scale and to meet a low demand at the same time: "The normal tendency
towards locational specialisation was reinforced by the concentration of production in a
small number of large enterprises - in the extreme, in a single enterprise per industry"27.
In the early 1970s, the policy of "systematization" introduced an artificial hierarchy of
settlements which distorted the historical settlement system by developing selected
towns and neglecting others.28 Until the mid-90s, no comprehensive and coherent
institutional and legal framework for regional policy had been established in Romania,
although several legislative measures with a major spatial impact - such as on local
administration, small and medium enterprises, private land ownership or foreign
investment - have been adopted.29
6ORYHQLD as a republic of Yugoslavia had its own regional policy for the co-ordination of
regional development and the promotion of less-developed communes since the early
1970s.30 As the specific economic system in Yugoslavia, which was characterised by
self-management of firms, had a stronger market orientation than other socialist coun-
tries, the objective of a special regional fund was to reduce inter-urban differences by
implementing a "policentric concept of development"31. After 1990, regional incentives
were drastically reduced. A new concept for regional development focuses on three
types of regions: structurally weak regions, unstable regions with an old industrial
structure and border regions. "Action areas" include support for direct investment via
soft loans, interest subsidies and grants.
                                                
25 Cf. OECD-CCET (1996), p.101.
26 Cf. OECD-CCET (1996), p.76.
27 European Commission (1992), p.15.
28 Cf. Anton/Danciu/Mitu (1993), p.9.
29 Cf. Constantin (1995), p.20.
30 Cf. EPRC/RWI (1996), p.179.
31 Cf. Kukar (1993), p.14.10
5HJLRQDOGLVSDULWLHV
Describing regional disparities in the CEECs is constrained by the availability of
regional data. Best access to data is given for the labour market, i.e. for unemployment
and employment, and some rough estimations on regional income have been made.
However, some caveats have to be added as to the reliability of this data concerning the
private sector whose SMEs still tend to escape the statistical system.
8QHPSOR\PHQW
In the central planning systems, unemployment was politically not accepted and existed
only in its hidden form of labour-hoarding within firms. This changed during the reform
process when registered unemployment increased to two-digit rates in all countries (with
the exception of the Czech Republic). On a regional level, although regular Labour
Force Surveys are carried out in most of the CEECs since 1992, there are only registered
unemployment rates available which are regularly published by the European Commis-
sion (DG V) in the "Employment Observatory Central & Eastern Europe".32 For this
purpose, in most of the countries administrative regions have been merged to larger sta-
tistical units in order to have labour market regions with a stronger statistical link
between employment and unemployment which is not cut by commuting between
regions. The average size of the statistical regions in terms of labour force is still
varying considerably from 322,000 in Bulgaria, which is about the average of NUTS 3
regions in the EU, up to 2 million in Poland, which is approximately the average size of
NUTS 2 regions (see table 3.3 in the annex). Except for Albania and Hungary, where
51% and 40% of the labour force respectively are concentrated in the region of the
capital city, the regional distribution of the labour force is rather even. Due to the
differing size of regions and the variety in the definition of unemployment, comparisons
of unemployment rates between CEECs have to be treated with care.
Map 3.2 in the annex shows unemployment rates for 1994 above 20% in the north-east
of Poland, the north-east of Albania and the north-west of Bulgaria. Rates below 7.5%
could be found in all regions of the Czech Republic and in the regions of the capitals
(Bratislava, Bucharest, Sofia; the Budapest region was at 7.6%). Apart from these
extremes, there are different degrees of homogeneity between the countries: While in
Romania (with the exception of North and South Moldova) and the Czech Republic the
rates vary only little, there are major differences within Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Bul-
garia and Albania (see table 3.4 in the annex).
The performance of regional unemployment rates from 1990 to the second quarter of
1995 (see table 3.5 in the annex) is less differentiated on the regional than on the
                                                
32 In comparison to the ILO definition of unemployment these rates will be too low in countries with little
incentives to be registered as unemployed (and vice versa).11
national level, basically reflecting the differing speed of the reform process: In Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia unemployment increased most in 1991/92,
while in Hungary and Romania the biggest increase took place in the years 1992/93.
Except for Slovakia, Romania and the Czech Republic, unemployment decreased in
most of the CEECs’ regions after 1994. In general, those regions with the sharpest rise in
unemployment at the start of the transition process are also those with the highest rates
some years later because the sectoral structure causes continuing problems.33 New
employment opportunities in the private sector have been created mainly in urban and
diversified regions with already low unemployment.
Apart from methodological factors, there are several reasons for the variation of unem-
ployment rates between the CEECs such as differences in macro-economic policy, in the
reorientation of trade from eastern to western partners as well as in the speed and ways
of reform and privatisation. Yet this does not explain the regional pattern of unemploy-
ment which is mainly dependent on the structure of employment inherited from the
socialist era determining the reduction of old jobs and the creation of new jobs.
(PSOR\PHQWE\VHFWRUV
Data on the structure of employment in CEEC regions are available by broad sectors for
the four Visegrad countries in 1991.34 Although this data may seem out-dated, it
expresses more than might be expected. Firstly, it indicates the starting positions of the
different regions which do not change too quickly due to the magnitude of regional
problems and the slow pace of structural change. Secondly, older data will have a better
coverage which corresponds mostly with state-owned firms; a too strong reliance on
more recent data could be misleading as it would not take into account the informal
status of many new private firms and the importance of the black economy in most
CEECs.
Maps 3.3 a-c in the annex show the regions by their shares of employment in
agriculture, industry and services. For statistical reasons, comparisons between the
countries might be difficult and suggest to compare the regions in relation to their
national average. This is given in table 3.6 in the annex by classifying the regions
according to sectoral employment shares above the national average. On this
classification of regions several observations can be made:
· Regions with the severest problems will be those that are highly specialised either in
agriculture or in industry (categories A and I). Most Polish and Hungarian regions
are extremely mono-structural with the exception of the capitals and major cities.
                                                
33 Cf. EPRC/RWI (1996), p.60.
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Some Polish regions have employment shares in agriculture of more than 50% and
some Hungarian regions of up to 30%. Industrial employment is higher than 60% in
two Polish regions (Katowice, Lodz) and in several Hungarian regions. Many of
these industry regions are specialised in a few industries such as engineering, metals
as well as textiles and clothing.35 In the Czech Republic and Slovakia - correspond-
ing to the former policy of decentralised urbanisation - there is a wider spread over
all categories of sectoral employment with only few regions being clearly either agri-
cultural or industrial which might also face problems where industrial sites have
been established regardless of transport costs.
· Lagging regions with a certain development potential will be those that have - in
spite of a high importance of agriculture - a considerable share of employment in
industry or services. These are mostly regions of the Czech Republic and Slovakia
(category A+I) as well as some Polish and Hungarian regions that have high
employment in agriculture and services (category A+S). In most of these regions,
development potentials are connected to locational factors such as proximity to
western countries or natural conditions making them favourable locations for indus-
try or tourism.
· Some regions are highly developed in relation to the rest of their country and have a
rather diversified sectoral structure (categories I+S, S). These are the capitals of the
four Visegrad countries (Warsaw, Prague, Budapest and Bratislava) and other Polish
regions with a considerable industrial base and/or located at the Baltic Sea (e.g.
Gdansk, Krakow, Lodz, Poznan, Szczecin or Wroclaw). Most of these growth poles
are well equipped with basic infrastructure and production-oriented services, but
face extremely high congestion, housing and environmental problems due to their
level of economic development and to a high population density. They have been the
most attractive locations of investment in the recent years causing bottlenecks within
these regions and increasing regional disparities between these growth poles and the
rest of the country.
This pattern of sectoral employment is basically in line with the regional distribution of
unemployment which has the lowest rates in "the area around the capital city or the most
industrialised parts" and the highest rates in "regions dependent on agriculture or on
basic industries in decline".36 It also corresponds with other typologies of CEECs’
regions as, for instance, the ones given in studies carried out for the European Commis-
sion (DG XVI) which differentiate problem regions with predominantly agrarian struc-
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tures, mono-structural industrial regions and prospering regions.37 A similar typology
divides CEEC regions into "leaders of transformation" (capital cities and other major
centres), "newcomers" (western regions), "losers" (old industrial regions) and "backward
peripheries" (eastern regions).38 These typologies are essentially consistent with the
ones frequently applied in western countries which found their expression in the
structure of the regional Structural Funds objectives: Objective 1 for lagging regions,
Objective  2 for regions in industrial decline and Objective  5b for rural regions
(supplemented in 1995 by Objective  6 for regions with extremely low population
density). In spite of these structural similarities of western and eastern European
typologies of regions, however, there are considerable differences in the dimension of
problems.
The potentials of the regions within the categories might vary considerably depending
on locational factors such as infrastructure equipment, environmental pollution, human
resources and dependence on sensitive sectors whose trade with the European Union is
exempted from the Europe agreements and will be restricted for a longer period of time.
Nevertheless, the typology gives a first idea of the future objectives of regional policies
in the CEECs: diversification of the economic structure in mono-structural problem
regions, development of the locational advantages in regions with development potential
and removal of bottlenecks in the growth poles. However, it is not straightforward if
these objectives - and which of them - should be targeted by EU structural assistance.
5HJLRQDOLQFRPH
Regional data on GDP in CEECs are even less available and of lower quality than those
on the national level. Starting from the national data from Eurostat/OECD as presented
above in section 2 (see table 2.1 in the annex), CEPR/RWI (1996, pp.92ff.) have calcu-
lated regional GDP per capita for the six larger transition countries by applying regional
data that were available in national statistics: in the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary
and Romania the data approximated to GDP, in Slovakia gross value added and in Bul-
garia gross material production. In some cases, when income data at regional level were
not available, artificial indices on the basis of sectoral output or employment were con-
structed. The territorial units were grouped into larger regions in analogy to those pre-
sented above on unemployment data (see map 3.2 and table 3.3 in the annex). The out-
come of this exercise is presented in table 3.8 in the annex and should only be regarded
as an indication for existing regional income disparities within the CEECs rather than as
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developed and residual areas respectively.
38 Cf. EPRC/RWI (1996), p.171.14
exact statistical data. However, they will exaggerate regional disparities because the
regional breakdown of national figures expressed in purchasing power does not take
regional price differences into account.
Some interesting results appear from calculating indicators on the basis of the national
average, the EU15 average and the EU25 average. The most striking result is the leading
position of the capital city regions exceeding the national average by 25% (Bucharest),
50% (Prague), 70% (Warsaw), 80% (Budapest) and 150% (Sofia). Compared to the
EU 15 average, these regions already have higher income levels than the poorer regions
of the present EU. According to this data, Prague and Budapest which are the most
important growth poles of their countries would already be in danger of being ineligible
to Objective 1 assistance of the Structural Funds in a EU 25 if the indicator of 75% were
strictly applied to the regional level.
In some countries, apart from their capitals, income seems to be quite evenly distributed
across the regions. In the Czech Republic, income is the lowest in Mid Bohemia (87%
of the national average) and the highest in East Bohemia (99%). Most Romanian regions
vary around the national average, except for North and South Moldova (87% and 88%).
In Slovakia only the central part is significantly below the national average (87%),
although disparities might be higher if a more detailed breakdown were taken. In the
remaining countries, regional differences are much wider with income levels below 70%
of the national average in several Bulgarian regions and in the north-east of Hungary. In
Poland, all eastern regions vary around 80% except for the Warsaw region (excluding
Warsaw city) whose low value of 73% is probably partly a statistical phenomenon as a
consequence of commuting.
Trends in regional income are difficult to identify due to a lack of comparable data. Tak-
ing indicators within countries, regional disparities seem to have widened since the
beginning of the 1990s as is evidenced by average wages in Poland, industrial
production in Hungary and industrial income in Bulgaria.39 New firm formation and
FDI inflows tend to favour capital city regions but are subject to major statistical
uncertainties.
1DWLRQDOYHUVXVUHJLRQDOGHYHORSPHQWSROLF\"
Before the implications for EU structural assistance can be discussed, some of its
constraints have to be taken into account. Rough calculations on the application of
Structural Funds to CEECs comparable to the volume of assistance to present Member
States have come to differing results saying that the Union budget would have to
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increase by amounts up to 40 billion ECU per year. The results vary with the assump-
tions on the number of acceding countries, their assumed level of GDP and the
indicators of comparison to present beneficiaries. These orders of magnitude for
increasing the Structural Funds from one year to the next have to be seen as unrealistic
for several reasons. Firstly, net contributing Member States seem to have little
willingness to increase their contributions to the Union budget substantially. Therefore,
it has been suggested to maintain the own resources ceiling for the Union budget of
1.27% of GDP and spend a constant percentage of the Union GDP on Structural
Policies, in this way having the Funds increase in line with GDP growth in the Union.40
With the working hypothesis of maintaining the expected share of 0.46% of Structural
Funds relative to the Union’s GDP in 1999 for a possible programming period 2000-
2006, structural spending could increase from 28 bn. ECU per year in the present
programming period to 37 bn. ECU per year in the future period.41 This would allow for
an increase in funds available for assistance in CEECs while consolidating the efforts in
favour of the present Member States. Secondly, the Member States who are main
beneficiaries of the Structural Funds related to GDP already show problems concerning
their absorptive capacity due to the limited capacities of their administrative system.
While it is difficult to estimate an upper limit of absorption capacity, this suggests at
least a slow phasing-in of assistance in CEECs rather than a front-loading. Thirdly, the
political margin for a concentration of the Funds in the present Member States in order
to re-allocate to new Member States will be limited. "Soft landings" for regions that will
cease to be eligible have to be planned, not only for political reasons, but also for
economic reasons to avoid negative shocks.
An outcome of these constraints will be a limited access for the CEECs to EU funds in
the next years. Whatever the institutional framework of assistance may be - PHARE,
pre-accession aid, Structural Funds - decisions on priorities will have to be taken. One
of the most crucial decisions will be on the regional allocation of funds, in particular
whether to promote primarily national or regional development objectives in the
CEECs.
This issue of national versus regional development policy can be dealt with by asking
several questions:
· Why at all should a regional policy be carried out? (section 4.1)
· In a "multi-layer state" with different layers like the European Union, who should be
responsible for regional policy? (section 4.2)
· Is there a trade-off between national and regional development policy so that both
policies can hardly be followed at the same time? (section 4.3)
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7KHFDVHIRUUHJLRQDOSROLF\
In principle, regional policy can have two objectives: improving efficiency and
providing more regional equality. A discussion of the first objective is prevalent in
economic theories on regional policy. The second objective is not necessarily only
achieved by transfers to individuals, but can also be followed by providing equal supply-
side conditions of growth; in this context, growth theory is relevant.
Efficiency arguments for and against regional policy can be found in the context of
static economic models of foreign trade theory. In the standard neo-classical model there
is almost no need for a regional policy, not only for the reason that space does not exist
in most models because there are no transport costs. But even if two regions are
assumed as points, the reduction of barriers either to trade or to factor movements will
immediately lead to factor price equalisation caused by an adjustment process without
cost and time. Assuming economies of scale and transaction costs changes the model
radically: Bigger markets and lower transaction costs create a competitive advantage of
agglomerations that may become a self-perpetuating process of cumulative causation, in
which trade and factor movements cause relative advantages of competitiveness in the
centre and relative disadvantages of competitiveness in the periphery.42 The final
outcome of this process may be agglomeration diseconomies (like negative
externalities) in the centre that will be an impediment to further growth, creating a
necessity to make other locations attractive to factor flows. Some of the costs for
recovering the competitiveness of the periphery (e.g. for rebuilding infrastructure) could
have been economised on, if a regional policy would have contributed to a regionally
more balanced development. However, this efficiency argument for regional policy is
more relevant to the more industrialised economies where public investment in the
periphery had already been undertaken and where there is a risk of losing this capital.
The most important factors for providing equal conditions of growth are discussed
within the context of growth theory. Neo-classical growth theorists would hardly see the
necessity for conducting a regional policy because - other things being equal, in particu-
lar the production technology and the speed of technological change - decreasing mar-
ginal returns to capital productivity will lead to higher returns, investment and growth
rates in the low productivity regions and in this way to an equalisation of productivity.
All that is to be done is a reduction of barriers to trade and/or factor mobility by a liber-
alisation of goods and factor markets. As empirical researchers could not find a
tendency for (unconditional) convergence on an international level, "new" growth theory
made the causes of technological change endogenous to the models. This was done by
assigning special characteristics to human or public capital, in particular positive
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externalities or economies of scale, so that marginal returns to capital productivity are
no longer decreasing. A regional policy based on new growth theory should therefore
concentrate on promoting infrastructure, technology and human resources.
To sum up, the static and dynamic models of the standard neo-classical approach see
regional policy mainly as liberalisation policies. New approaches in economic
geography and growth theory present some additional arguments in favour of public
support for infrastructure, technology and human capital formation.
7KHDVVLJQPHQWRIUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVLQDPXOWLOD\HUVWDWH
Once the general need for regional policy is accepted, the subsidiarity principle suggests
to ask what level of government in a "multi-layer state" like the European Union should
be in charge of which activities. The economic theory of (fiscal) federalism gives some
help by discussing the optimal division of labour in a federal state.43 The diversity of
preferences and the reduction of transaction costs being the main cases for the lowest
possible level of responsibilities, there are three main cases for assigning responsibilities
to a higher level of government:
(1) inter-regional redistribution,
(2) inter-regional externalities (or spillovers) and
(3) economies of scale in the provision of a public good.
From an economic point of view there is not much to be said about an "optimum" of
LQWHUUHJLRQDOUHGLVWULEXWLRQwhich is mainly depending on the political willingness of
richer regions to direct transfers or capital to poorer regions. In this way efficiency gains
(e.g. from economic integration) are separated from - rather than prevented by - dis-
tributive objectives. However, it must be taken into account that there will be some
efficiency losses as the incentives to provide for one’s own income decrease with
increasing redistribution. Once the volume of redistribution is fixed, a decision must be
taken between a concept of purely inter-regional transfers (like the German
"Finanzausgleich") or a concept of some kind of regional policy. While both concepts
require a certain activity of the higher level, the first concept is suffering from the
possibility that recipient regions might use the transfers for purposes which were not in-
tended by the donating regions. In particular, consumptive uses will give the donating
regions a perspective of permanent transfers, while investive uses open up a perspective
of only temporary assistance for catching up. This is the main rationale for financing and
controlling regional interventions on a centralised level.
,QWHUUHJLRQDOH[WHUQDOLWLHV (or spillovers) distort the allocation of resources because
activities with negative (positive) externalities are higher (lower) than preferred by the
recipient regions. For example, as regards growth effects of public infrastructure "... the
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estimates tend to be larger at the federal level than at the state level, and larger at the
state level than the municipal level."44 This is basically due to positive network exter-
nalities which are received by all participants of a network if it is enlarged anywhere.
But the need to internalise externalities to improve allocation does not necessarily
require an intervention of the higher level, if the involved regions can agree on
compensatory schemes. Because this is a spatial application of the so-called “Coase
theorem”, this will only be the case if property rights are fully assigned and if
transaction costs are negligible. In practice, however, transaction costs are often
prohibitively high suggesting that the higher government level should take over
responsibilities with a degree of intervention to be discussed from case to case.
(FRQRPLHVRIVFDOH in the provision of public goods can be realised when co-operation
between regions or countries reduces average costs because of high fixed costs or the
avoidance of double work. In particular, some industries and R&D activities have these
characteristics, which do not necessarily require state interventions, but might do when
major positive externalities (e.g. technological progress) can be expected.
Summarising, inter-regional redistribution, internalisation of externalities and realisation
of economies of scale are the main arguments for regional policy at a centralised level.
For the European Union as a community of nation states, this would imply to transfer
funds from rich to poor Member States (and to non-members), to reduce externalities
between Member States and to finance large-scale projects, i.e. very little direct inter-
vention at the regional level with the exception of activities for which transaction costs
of trans-national co-operation may be too high, such as for inter-regional co-operation.
At the national level, this would include, for instance, allocating money to the regions,
constructing infrastructure and providing large-scale public goods. The regional and
local level should particularly carry out policies that need to take into account the
diversity of preferences (e.g. education) and that have potential for reducing transaction
costs (e.g. administration).
7KH:LOOLDPVRQK\SRWKHVLV
Countries in a process of catching-up usually have not only a development gap towards
industrialised countries, but also major disparities between the regions within the coun-
try. In this regards, an important issue is a possible trade-off between national and
regional cohesion in the process of national development. Williamson (1965) has pre-
sented the hypothesis that the typical pattern of national development creates an inter-
regional divergence at the early stages of development and an inter-regional
convergence in the later stages: "The expected result is that a statistic describing re-
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gional inequality will trace out an inverted ’U’ over the national growth path."45 Mainly
based on arguments of Myrdal and Hirschman, he maintains that inter-regional linkages,
factor movements and central government policies are selective in favour of the centres
in the early stages of development, while a higher income level in the later stages of
development allows a reversal of this tendency. This relation between regional equality
and national development is illustrated in graph 4.1, with G representing income
dispersion and \ income per capita. Accordingly, in high-income countries the two
objectives of growth on a national level and convergence of the regions are not con-
flicting, but in low-income countries they are. Williamson presents some cross-sectional
and historical data to prove his hypothesis.46
A normative interpretation of this hypothesis leaves policy-makers in low income coun-
tries only the choice between a higher level of national income and a higher degree of
regional equality. In graph 4.1, social preferences U0 are assumed whose tangential
point with the Williamson curve is an optimal combination of per capita income and
regional disparities (y0d0). Assuming a better articulation of social preferences on a
decentralised level (e.g. Member States or regions) than on a centralised level (e.g.
European Union), a centralised decision in favour of more regional equality (y1d1)
might lead to a loss of welfare (U1). This situation is rather plausible: Confronted with
high needs and scarce means, poorer countries often have a preference for promoting
national development and creating good conditions for private investment by a
concentration of public investment on a few growth poles rather than spreading a low
level assistance all over the country and in this way loosing relative attractiveness for
private investment in the whole country.
*UDSK:LOOLDPVRQ
VK\SRWKHVLVRQWKHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQQDWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQWDQG
UHJLRQDOLQHTXDOLW\
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46 For a summary of criticism on the Williamson hypothesis see Richardson (1978), p.23.20
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However, some critical remarks on this normative version of Williamson’s hypothesis
should be noted. Part of the explanation for the U-type relation was the orientation of
central government policies towards the centres; a normative interpretation then simply
gives an ex post justification for these policies. Furthermore, not all regional policy
projects are beneficiary either to the centre or to the periphery; for example, given they
have access, both types of regions usually benefit from constructing infrastructure net-
works. Finally, some scepticism on the ability of regional policy to direct the process of
regional development should be added because other regional location factors, such as
peripherality, which can only be changed to a certain degree, might be more important
than policy measures.
The trade-off between equity and efficiency in cohesion countries is far from purely
theoretical. De la Fuente (1996, pp.17ff.) has simulated this trade-off for Spain in the
period 1981 to 1990 on the basis of an estimated production function including public
investment. The result compared to the baseline is that an extremely redistributive
policy of public investment would have reduced regional disparities by 13.54% at the
expense of a 1.62% decrease of Spanish GDP. The alternative extreme policy oriented
towards efficiency by allocating public investment according to rentability would have
increased GDP by 1.58% and regional disparities by 18.29%. In a regional breakdown
this means that for most Spanish regions the expected rentability is above national
average in the wealthier regions and below national average in the poorer regions. These
results indicate the conflict for decisions on the regional allocation of public investment
in Spain whether to promote convergence of the whole country towards the European
average or to promote the convergence of regions towards the national average.21
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Theoretical arguments and empirical evidence outlined above will have several policy
implications if one assumes that EU structural assistance to CEECs will either move
from a system of PHARE assistance towards a scheme similar to the Structural Funds or
that the Structural Funds will adapt to the needs and conditions of the CEECs. In any
case, one will have to consider both schemes of assistance by taking the PHARE assis-
tance as a starting point (section 5.1) and looking at the appropriateness of the Structural
Funds (section 5.2).
7KHSUHVHQWVLWXDWLRQ3+$5(DVVLVWDQFH
Apart from EIB loans with a total volume of 3,449 MECU from 1991 to 1995 mostly
for infrastructure and global loans,47 grants from the PHARE programme were the most
important source of financing for EU structural assistance in CEECs. PHARE was
launched in 1990 to support economic and social restructuring in the CEECs in
transition according to the countries’ needs.48 A major change in the programme was
introduced after the European Council meeting in Essen in December 1994 had adopted
a pre-accession strategy for CEECs which included the Europe agreements, the
structured dialogue and the programme PHARE as its financial instrument. The main
role of EU financial assistance under the PHARE programme was to be re-oriented to
“help the associated countries to absorb the ‘acquis communautaire’ and to complete
market reforms and medium-term restructuring of their economies and societies so as to
create the conditions required for future membership”49. Priority objectives were
decided to be measures to promote the approximation of laws and standards as well as
the economic reform process and the development of adequate infrastructure. As regards
the latter, the limitation of infrastructure as a percentage of total financing by PHARE
was increased from originally 15% to 25%.
An indicative multi-annual planning was introduced, allocating a total of 6,693 MECU
for the period 1995-1999 and rising in annual terms from 1,154 MECU (1995) to 1,634
MECU (1999). The new approach of programming started with four country operational
programmes for the period 1996-1999 (for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and
Slovakia) which define objectives, priority sectors, activities, calendar and the
respective funds. Due to their indicative character, an annual budgetary procedure on the
                                                
47 Cf. European Investment Bank (1996).
48 In budgetary terms, PHARE consists of five budget lines: B7-5200 (democracy), B7-6000 (economic
restructuration), B7-6020 (cross-border cooperation), B7-6310 (NGOs), B7-6330 (access to Community
programmes).
49 European Council (1994).22
operational programmes for each country - referring to the programmes in a flexible way
- is still necessary. The proposals from the partner countries are scrutinised by the
PHARE Management Committee in Brussels, made up of representatives of the
Member States of the European Union, and form the core of the respective financing
memoranda signed by the European Commission and the partner countries. The
implementation of the programmes is organised by a shared responsibility of the
Commission in Brussels, its local delegation and the partner country. Evaluation and
monitoring is i.a. carried out by three regional offices with independent consultants who
are to examine more than 400 projects each year.
Looking at PHARE assistance between 1990 and 1995, total commitments of 5,417
MECU have been made with a clear concentration on infrastructure as the most impor-
tant priority sector (see table 5.1). Defining infrastructure in a narrow sense, i.e. by
transport, energy and telecommunication, it absorbed almost a fifth of the total, whereas
in a wider sense, including environment, public institutions and health, it absorbed more
than a third. Infrastructure financing by PHARE is subject to certain rules among which
the principal are:50
·  the project must be a stated priority on which the partner country has decided in its
own responsibility;
·  PHARE’s contribution must have a clear additional benefit to the project which is
particularly given when several countries are involved i.e. in trans-European
networks;
·  the PHARE contribution has to be complementary and should not compete with other
sources of financing;
·  the project must be in line with the Union standards.
A second focus of assistance was the productive sector in order to support restructuring
of state enterprises and private sector development, agricultural restructuring and the
financial sector. Thirdly, other “soft” measures were funded by projects in education,
training and research, emergency aid, social development and employment, consumer
protection as well as the promotion of the civil society and democratisation.
A major part of these projects is implemented in the context of cross-border co-opera-
tion jointly financed by INTERREG (in EU border regions) and PHARE (in CEEC bor-
der regions). Initially, funds were concentrated on infrastructure but have been expanded
to “soft actions” (such as tourism, human resources and culture) in 1995. However, this
is not necessarily to be seen as an instrument of regional policy since most of the
CEECs’ regions involved in these programmes are already in a privileged position given
their proximity to the West which is a major advantage to them since the opening of the
borders.
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7DEOH3+$5(FRPPLWPHQWVE\VHFWRUVLQ0(&8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
Infrastructure (transport, energy, telecommunication) 1,044.7
Private sector development and enterprise support 863.1
Education, training and research 746.3
Other sectors 543.0
Environment and nuclear safety 483.4
Agricultural restructuring 441.1
Critical aid 392.7
Financial sector 249.2
Public institutions and administrative reform 233.9
Social development and employment 177.5
Public health 101.5
Integrated regional measures 81.8
Civil society and democratisation 45.7
Consumer protection 11.0
Approximation of legislation 2.0
7RWDO 
Source: European Commission (1996b), pp.40ff.
Funds explicitly devoted to support less favoured regions are almost negligible. Only 82
MECU have been spent on integrated regional measures, 47 of which in 1995 (see table
5.2). This increase might indicate a recent tendency in favour of regional development
which is among the long list of priority objectives of all new multi-annual programmes.
Another regional orientation is implemented by projects of inter-regional co-operation
between cities and regions of EU and CEECs - not limited to border regions - in the
context of the sub-programme ECOS/OUVERTURE whose modest support is however
of low significance in terms of total PHARE assistance. A further PHARE pilot pro-
gramme with a regional orientation, called “Struder”, is on the regional development of
selected conversion regions in Poland.
To sum up, structural assistance by the PHARE programme has changed from an “ad
hoc”-instrument to an instrument of the pre-accession strategy partly based on principles
such as programming, partnership, subsidiarity, monitoring and evaluation. Given that
the partner countries’ priorities are respected in the design of programmes and projects,
the limited efforts regarding regional development objectives can only be seen as an
indication of its presently low priority for CEECs’ governments.
7DEOH,QWHJUDWHGUHJLRQDOPHDVXUHVRIWKH3+$5(SURJUDPPHLQ0(&8
      WRWDO
$OEDQLD 00000 8 . 5 8 . 5
+XQJDU\ 00 1 0 005 1 524
6ORYDNLD 00000 1 . 5 1 . 5
PXOWLFRXQWU\ 0 4.3 6.5 10 4 0 24.8
RWKHU 00000 3 2 3 2
WRWDO 0 4.3 16.5 10 4 47 81.8
Note: Excluding cross-border co-operation; countries not mentioned have no expenditure in this sector.
Source: European Commission (1996b), p.43.
7KHDSSURSULDWHQHVVRIWKH6WUXFWXUDO)XQGV
The four operating principles which were introduced in the reform of the Structural
Funds in 1988 - concentration, partnership, programming and additionality - are their
constituting elements. The appropriateness of the Structural Funds for CEECs is thus
best to be discussed by these principles.
&RQFHQWUDWLRQ
EU structural assistance for economic and social cohesion within the Union - including
Structural Funds, Cohesion Fund and Community Initiatives - had an annual average of
14.7 bn. ECU in the period 1989-93 (in current prices) and is planned to have an annual
average of 27.9 bn. ECU (in 1994 prices) in the period 1994-99.51 In order to better tar-
get this assistance, the Structural Funds concentrate on six priority objectives, of which
70% are allocated to lagging regions whose per capita GDP is less than 75% of the
Union average (Objective 1). Further regional Objectives are those for areas affected by
industrial decline (Objective 2), rural areas (Objective 5b) and very sparsely populated
areas (Objective 6).
A question that arises is whether a new objective for transition economies should be
introduced. An argument in favour could be the specificity of the economic situation of
CEECs and their regions that might require very specific policy instruments completely
different to the present Member States. However, the typology of regions outlined above
has already shown that the differences in regional problems are quantitative rather than
qualitative. Mono-structural regions depending on few industries can also be found in
western Europe. The existence of a large state sector is nothing specific to CEECs as,
for instance, also in the two poorest Member States, Greece and Portugal, large parts of
industry and services were owned by the state when they acceded the European Com-
munity, although the pace of privatisation after the accession was much slower than in
the CEECs in the last years. The lack of the peculiarity of transformation problems is
also reflected by the fact that economists did not feel the need of constructing an
"economic theory of transformation" because most of the issues could well be covered
by already existing theoretical approaches addressing problems of market economies.
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For the time being, it will hardly be possible to identify eligibility for the existing Objec-
tives on a regional level because of a lack of reliable regional data for CEECs. Even if it
were possible, the segmentation of a CEEC’s territory by the different Objectives would
increase co-ordination costs and would reduce the synergy effects of projects, such as
for example for trans-European networks. If the territories of CEECs were to be
considered as a whole, the criterion of eligibility for Objective 1 would probably be
fulfilled for all CEECs even if a reduced EU25 average GDP per capita is taken into
account.
An issue that arises from applying Objective 1 to CEECs is if a new eligibility criterion
will be needed, given that the application of the present criterion would make all of their
territories eligible due to missing or unreliable data on regional GDP. This would give
CEECs a wide margin of decision in allocating funds to their regions and to different
measures on public infrastructure, human resources and productive environment. But
apart from financial constraints, there should be no reason to narrow this margin. And in
spite of various deficiencies, GDP per capita is still the most frequently applied
indicator of wealth. Other available indicators, such as regional unemployment rates,
reflect not necessarily development needs and could even be a disincentive for reducing
unemployment figures.
The theoretical arguments presented in section 4 might be extremely relevant for deci-
sions on the regional concentration of EU structural assistance in the CEECs. In the
light of the financial constraints of EU assistance, priority should be given to the
removal of bottlenecks in growth poles, which will promote faster convergence of the
national income per capita towards the Union average but might increase regional
disparities, rather than giving assistance primarily to lagging regions, which might allow
them to catch up to the national average to the possible detriment of national income
growth. In the long-term perspective of the lagging region of a poorer country, regional
development could even be slower if funds are directly allocated to the lagging region
because of a slow-down of national development, and could be faster if funds are
allocated to the growth poles subsequently creating positive spill-overs to the lagging
regions.
However, the above discussion suggests also to avoid a degree of urbanisation where
agglomeration diseconomies become prevalent. But as to the assignment of responsibili-
ties there is hardly any economic argument why the European Union should intervene
directly into the regional policy of its Member States. The possible trade-off between
national and regional development in less developed countries suggests rather to leave
decisions on regional policy priorities to the national level.
In the past, the Structural Funds programmes have avoided to take a clear-cut position
by financing all types of regions in cohesion countries. In Portugal, for instance, Struc-26
tural Funds are highest in absolute terms in the wealthiest regions (Lisbon, Norte), but
are highest in per capita terms in the poorest regions (Alentejo, Azores, Madeira). In the
CEECs, however, the low level of national income and the financial constraints of
public expenditure might increase pressure to give priority to the growth poles and to
pursuit regional equality only as a secondary objective.
Moreover, the institutional setting in the CEECs’ regions might still be inadequate to
have measures carried out directly on the regional level. Given the political
sensitiveness of restructuring territorial administration, for historical and ethnic reasons,
hardly any of the CEECs has so far assigned considerable power to the regional level.
Connected to this, regional statistics will hardly give an adequate basis for the clear
identification of regional problems on which concentration of funds is mostly needed.
3DUWQHUVKLS
The principle of partnership involves close collaboration between the Commission and
the relevant authorities at national, regional or local level appointed by each Member
State, at all stages of programming. In 1994 it was extended to "competent authorities
and bodies" including the economic and social partners. The principle is to ensure that
no decision is taken without consulting the involved partners.
There will be several problems in applying the principle of partnership in the CEECs
due to the lack of administrative and social partners in particular at the regional level
(not always on the local level). As outlined above, the regional level is still in a process
of restructuring and not yet well established in most CEECs. The same is true for the
economic and social partners because, in the socialist era, organisations of managers and
workers were closely connected to the political system and “their adaptation to the new
market conditions has been stalled by financial problems (as potential members can
often not spare the necessary contributions), their limited range of services and lack of
credibility in their independence”52. Due to the importance of trade unions in the
transition process, Poland seems to be the most advanced in this respect, as Voivodship
or local employment councils have been created which represent employees and
employers as well as state and local administrations.53
While partnership on a regional level might involve high co-ordination costs or might
sometimes even be impossible in most CEECs, the obligation of partnership on the
national level in the context of EU structural assistance could give incentives to speed
up the process of institution-building and democratisation. This has often been the case
in the more centralised EU Member States in the past and can already be observed in the
context of programmes on cross-border co-operation in CEECs. Nevertheless, it might
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take some time to build up and stabilise these organisational structures which will cer-
tainly go through changes for a considerable period of time. This might raise some prob-
lems - certainly soluble in the medium to long run - in establishing fixed organisational
structures as, for example, monitoring committees.
3URJUDPPLQJ
The principle of programming is carried out by setting timetable and scope for the allo-
cation of assistance in a programming document. It is to ensure that the different
projects are coherent with the overall development objectives. Again, this might face
some difficulties at the regional level in the CEECs due to the lack of administrative
capacity and organisational structures. While programming should in general be no
problem at the national level, there might be insufficient information to programme the
regional allocation of funds.
The Cohesion Fund takes a more pragmatic approach in financing projects or groups of
projects on trans-European transport networks and environment. In the course of an
eastern enlargement, an option for reform could therefore be to give Member States -
according to their income per capita - access HLWKHU to a Cohesion Fund-like scheme RU
to a Structural Funds-like scheme. Applying the present criteria of eligibility for the
Cohesion Fund, the Member States with a GNP per capita less than 90% of the EU
average would be supported by the Cohesion Fund-like scheme, while the other Member
States’ regions would be given assistance by the Structural Funds-like scheme. A Cohe-
sion Fund-like scheme would provide assistance in cohesion countries and broaden its
scope of assistance beyond transport and environment, in particular towards assistance
for human capital and the productive fabric, following a medium-term strategy as
defined by a national development programme. The main rationale of the proposal is to
define the cohesion objective clearer: The Cohesion Fund-like scheme would provide
for the real convergence of poorer Member States towards the Union, then being the
main instrument for re-distribution of funds from wealthier to poorer Member States,
while the Structural Funds-like scheme would provide for social and regional cohesion
in the wealthier Member States.
The clearer division of objectives between the cohesion of Member States on the one
hand and regional and social cohesion within Member States on the other hand would
allow a better targeting of programmes, projects and instruments. The Cohesion Fund-
like scheme could finance measures to address problems of catching-up which are spe-
cific to cohesion countries and would be similar to present PHARE assistance:
infrastructure, education and training, institution-building, privatisation, financial
markets, transfer of technology. The decision on the allocation of assistance to lagging
regions could be left to the national governments and would not require the prior28
establishment of regional administration. This decision could also take into account that
investment in infrastructure - as mentioned above - has a higher impact on the national
level than on the regional level.
A Cohesion Fund-like scheme targeting at the cohesion of Member States would
comply with Article 130a of the EC Treaty which specifies that “the Community shall
aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and
the backwardness of the less-favoured regions, including rural areas”. This requirement
would be fulfilled even if regions were not interpreted as Member States, but as sub-
units of Member States because the development of less-favoured regions in cohesion
countries will be more favourable - at least in the medium to long run - in an economy
whose process of catching-up is faster with the help of the most efficient use of EU
structural assistance.
The Structural Funds-like scheme could be much better targeted to the adjustment needs
of regions and labour markets in the wealthier countries. A further advantage would be
an improvement in the transparency of the Cohesion/Structural Policies and in that way
a strengthening of public support for redistribution between Member States.
$GGLWLRQDOLW\
The principle of additionality aims to ensure that financing from Community funds is
not used to replace national structural aid. Each Member State has to prove that it has
maintained its public structural or comparable expenditure in eligible regions as a whole
at least at the same level as in the previous programming period.
The verification of this principle for the present Member States is a difficult exercise, in
particular concerning the identification of public structural or comparable expenditure.
In CEECs, the problem of identifying the performance of eligible expenditure would be
even more difficult due to the fact that public and private investment can hardly be dis-
tinguished in socialist and post-socialist systems which will be reflected in the lack of
reliable statistical data. For this reason (and the obvious high level of public
investment), the application of the additionality principle in the eastern German Länder
was derogated during their initial period of Structural Funds’ assistance (from 1991 to
1993).
In theory, it is in the own interest of beneficiary countries to maintain a high level of
growth-enhancing public investment and to use the Structural Funds as an additional
support. In practice, however, governments tend to reduce investive rather than con-
sumptive expenditure when budgetary problems occur because the short-term impact is
less perceived by the population. For political reasons, it is therefore difficult for some
countries to maintain structural expenditure at a high level and to conduct a sustainable
fiscal policy at the same time. Nevertheless, present assistance from the Cohesion Fund29
is even conditional on having no excessive government deficit as set out in Article 104c
of the Treaty and allows for the suspension of financing new projects if the government
deficit is higher than recommended by the Council.
There might be some specific problems for CEECs to comply with the additionality
principle and to avoid excessive deficits at the same time. The main reason is that the
tax base is still low because the fiscal administration system is not yet fully established
making it easy for new private firms to evade taxation. In combination with a weak
statistical system to provide reliable forecasts, tax receipts can be subject to major
changes from one year to the next. On the expenditure side of the budget, special risks
may arise from state-owned or even private firms - as e.g. banks - for which the state
bails out in case of problems to avoid their bankruptcy mostly for reasons of national or
regional stabilisation. In view of these risks for revenues and expenditures in CEECs,
maintaining structural expenditure at a stable level without allowing for variations in
public deficits will be extremely difficult.
6XPPDU\DQGFRQFOXVLRQV
The gap of national development compared to the EU15 average income as measured by
income per capita in 1993 was considerable, the 10 associated CEECs’ average being at
29% of EU15 average.
Regional policies and the regions in CEECs are characterised by a missing level of
regional administration and statistics. Regional policy in the socialist era was essentially
the outcome of national sectoral plans and can broadly be categorised into two country
groups: A first group of countries, including Bulgaria, the German Democratic
Republic, Hungary and Poland, did not undertake major efforts to reduce inter-regional
disparities and allocated industries - although with several exceptions - according to
traditional locations. A second group of countries, among which Czechoslovakia,
Romania and Slovenia, tried to allocate industries to all regions of the country, in this
way creating intra-regional differences and locations that have problems to survive in a
competitive environment.
Although economic transition caused polarisation effects, an implemented regional
policy can hardly be found in any of these countries due to disputes over ministerial
responsibilities, the need to reform territorial administrative structures and the lack of
financial resources. A major regional orientation can only be found in some countries
with active labour market policies for problem regions as well as in the context of
programmes on cross-border co-operation.30
Describing regional disparities in the CEECs during the transformation process is
limited by insufficient regional data. Unemployment rates in Romania and the Czech
Republic vary only little across the regions, while there are major differences within
Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania. Classifying the regions in the four
Visegrad countries according to sectoral employment shares in 1991 above the national
average suggests a typology of regions as mono-structural problem regions, lagging
regions with a development potential and growth poles. This typology of regions is
essentially in line with the ones frequently applied in western countries and gives a first
idea of the future objectives of regional policies in the CEECs: diversification of the
economic structure in mono-structural problem regions, development of the locational
advantages in regions with a development potential and removal of bottlenecks in the
growth poles.
Given the financial constraints of implementing EU structural assistance in CEECs, one
of the most crucial decisions will be on the regional allocation of funds, in particular
whether to promote primarily national or regional development because a trade-off
between national and regional development policy could force governments to decide
whether to prioritise either national development or regional equality. The institutional
setting in the CEECs’ regions, i.e. the lack of regional administration and statistics, as
well as subsidiarity considerations suggest not to have structural assistance carried out
directly on a regional level.
Implications for EU structural assistance bringing together PHARE and Structural
Funds assistance were discussed following the four operating principles that were
introduced for the reform of the Structural Funds in 1988: concentration, partnership,
programming and additionality. In respect to concentration, no new objective for
countries in economic transformation should be introduced because the differences in
regional problems are of a quantitative dimension rather than of a qualitative one. The
basic problem in applying the principle of partnership would be a lack of administrative
and social partners at the regional level, but could be an important leverage for
democratisation and institution-building at the national level.
While programming should in general be no problem at the national level, there might
be insufficient information to programme the regional allocation of funds. In the course
of enlargement, an option for reform could be to give Member States access either to a
Cohesion Fund-like scheme or to a Structural Funds-like scheme in order to allow for a
better targeting of projects and instruments. The Cohesion Fund-like scheme would
provide for the real convergence of poorer Member States towards the Union, based on
a national development programme, while the Structural Funds-like scheme would pro-
vide for social and regional cohesion in the wealthier Member States.31
There might be some specific problems for CEECs to comply with the additionality
principle and to avoid excessive deficits at the same time. The main reason is that the
budgets of the CEECs still face some risks for revenues and expenditures. Therefore,
maintaining structural expenditure at a stable level without allowing for temporary
public deficits will be difficult for CEECs.
To sum up, several arguments suggest not to target EU structural assistance exclusively
at the reduction of regional disparities within CEECs. Doing so would not only face
problems due to missing administrations and statistics at the regional level, but might
also be at the expense of national economic growth and extend the process of catching-
up. A Cohesion Fund-like scheme could be developed into an adequate instrument for
assisting the real convergence of cohesion countries towards the Union.32
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